13:07, April 22, 2022
In 2008, the Russia
launched the major reform of its armed forces. In addition to modernizing equipment and armaments, it was a matter of optimizing the workforce and professionalizing the contingents. The effectives were set at one million men. In fact, the professional soldiers, both soldiers and officers, totaling more than 700,000 people, are still supported by some 260,000 conscripts. About 130,000 men between the ages of 18 and 27 are called up for each of the two annual calls, the duration of military service currently being twelve months.
In the context of the war launched by the Vladimir Putin regime against Ukraine
on February 24, it is important to return to the composition of the Russian army, especially from an ethnic and social point of view, because these aspects often escape the attention of observers. Yet they reveal the current structure of Russian society.
A globally respected institution
Alongside the presidency and the various security services, the military has traditionally been one of the most respected social institutions in Russia. Today, a majority of Russians trust their armed forces and believe that they are largely able to protect the country in the event of a military conflict. This view was shared by 60% of respondents in January 2014, before the start of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict and Russian military involvement in Syria; the ratio would have risen to 89% today.
Also read – Russian offensive in Donbass: ‘Ukraine is ready to fight in this region’
In May 2021, according to figures from the Levada Center, an independent polling station, 61% of Russians approved the statement that “any real man” to do his military service. 24% (42% among 18-24 year olds) thought it was a “duty to be proved to the state”, even if it may contradict the individual projects. Only 12% of respondents said military service was “unnecessary and dangerous” and this is how it should be “avoided at all costs”† However, these numbers are just a facade that hides complex social realities.
A Historic Multinational Army
The official formula, which wants Russia to have formed as a “multi-ethnic and multi-denominational state”, also applies to military matters.
Culturally non-Russian regiments existed within the Imperial armies and were part of the Tsar’s personal guard throughout the 19th century. During World War I, the native cavalry division known as the “Savage Division” was made up almost entirely of volunteers from the Muslim peoples of the Russian Empire.
Like the Soviet Union, the Red Army was multinational. The Second World War also affected all the populations of the USSR. Since the armed forces were based on conscription, the Soviet authorities took the “ethnic factor” very seriously, be it the distribution of conscripts according to the region of the encampment, the distribution limitation on the number of soldiers representing nationalities identified as “aggressive (the whites in particular), or even the use of soldiers as military translators (like the Tajiks during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan).
As early as 1979, the Soviet regime even requested two special forces detachments known as “Muslim battalions” in Afghanistan. Although these practices are clearly less common in today’s Russia, the multi-ethnic component is still characteristic of the armed forces.
Over-representation of minorities in the Russian military
The current war in Ukraine makes it possible to measure its magnitude, despite the lack of complete official data.
A week after the launch of what Moscow calls a “special military operation”For example, journalists from the Russian branch of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty analyzed the content of several Telegram channels that published information about Russian soldiers killed or captured in Ukraine. The results of the analysis showed that about 30% of surnames were similar to those of people from ‘non-Russian’ minorities, the vast majority of whom are of Muslim culture. There would therefore be an over-representation of minorities among the soldiers, who make up almost 20% of the general population of Russia.
A similar observation is made by independent researcher Kamil Galeev, who had access to a list of wounded soldiers sent to a hospital in Russia’s Rostov-on-Don region, located on the border with Ukraine (Donetsk and Luhansk regions). However, this data remains incomplete and does not allow us to state with certainty, as Galeev does, that the Russian military “minorities”. The human losses of the Russian army, confirmed by official sources on April 5, 2022 (1,083 people), show that the soldiers and officials killed in Ukraine came from all regions of Russia.
On the other hand, sending soldiers of “non-Slavic” descent to go to war in Ukraine could be a strategic choice by the Russian authorities, given the family ties that exist between many ethnic Russians and Ukrainians. We also know that the Russian state sets annual quotas to prevent too many conscripts from coming from the North Caucasus regions, for fear of increasing ethnic unrest within the regiments. the Russian term zemliatchesvo comes to describe these mutual aid communities, which are formed between conscripts from the same region of origin and form informal hierarchies that coexist with military discipline.
However, no one can ignore the significant presence, even the over-representation, of people of “non-Russian” ethnic or cultural origin in the regular armed forces, not to mention the Chechen battalions deployed in Syria (mainly the military police). and then in Ukraine (mainly from the National Guard), showing boundless devotion to their leader, Ramzan Kadyrov.
Several factors explain this situation and reveal the current state of the military and of Russian society as a whole.
Demographics, social mobility and economic stagnation
The first factor is demographics. In the period from 2018 to 2020, natural growth was observed in only 17 regions of Russia, out of a total of 85 (taking into account Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, which were illegally annexed in 2014). Of these 17 regions where the birth rate exceeds the death rate, the autonomous areas formed on a “non-Russian” ethnic basis are in the majority. This trend is long-lasting and has been confirmed over a longer period of time, especially since the 1990s and 2000s.
In addition to the Muslim republics of the North Caucasus (Daghestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachayevo-Chechnya, Chechnya), three Siberian republics are part of it: Yakutia (Sakha), Buryatia and Tuva. It is therefore not surprising that these areas offer a large number of conscripts, relative to that of their inhabitants.
A second factor that sheds light on the significant presence of ethnic minorities in the Russian military is due to the fact that military service is a privileged means of social mobility for these “non-Slavic” young men, who live in the most populous areas may be stigmatized by ethnic Russians. A similar trend can be observed in other countries, for example in the United States, where black people are overrepresented in the armed forces. In addition, the possibility of a stable career attracts a certain number of foreign citizens from 18 to 30 years old who speak Russian (especially nationals of the former Soviet republics of Central Asia): since 2010 they have the opportunity to join the Russian armed forces to conclude , by signing a five-year contract, renewable in case of acquisition of Russian citizenship.
An army of the poor?
In addition, there is a third factor that is difficult to underestimate: the autonomous areas mentioned are peripheral and economically disadvantaged regions, such as many ‘ethnic Russian’ regions. These areas are often characterized by high unemployment rates and low income levels, especially when compared to the country’s major metropolitan areas. These economic and social inequalities are reflected in differing attitudes towards military service.
Indeed, many young people from relatively wealthy backgrounds have a rather negative view of military service and the military in general, despite the above statistics. Many young people in the big cities are used to the comforts of city life and consumer society, and don’t feel ready to sacrifice their lives for the homeland. So they resort to maneuvers to avoid conscription: pursue university studies to get a temporary dispensation; pay a doctor to get a fake waiver certificate and get fired; or in the worst case call on alternative civil service in the form of community service (for example in a hospital).
The average salary of a professional soldier – 32,000 rubles (about €380) according to figures from the Russian Defense Ministry, lower than the official average salary of more than 50,000 rubles (600 euros) – is unlikely to attract many people from the educated middle class, even if in practice income is supplemented by increasingly important social guarantees (housing, military pension, loans at favorable interest rates, access to cultural and sports facilities).
On the other hand, military service is more attractive to those from disadvantaged backgrounds. While some simply do not have the financial means to avoid conscription, others see enlistment as a stable and paid career option, especially as the social standing of the military has clearly improved since the 2000s. This is mainly due to the increase in spending in the field of defense (probably the official figures are underestimated), to better discipline, resulting in reduction of hazing practices (dedovshchina), as well as the reduction in the length of military service (which has fallen from 24 to 12 months since 2008).
Aside from the stereotypes of masculinity that portray the military as a “life school for real men”, these changes mean that many young men from Russia’s periphery, those from the small towns and the countryside, want to join the ranks of the soldiers of their own free will. Unexpected situations can arise, for example when young nationals of the North Caucasus are willing to pay (sic) to be admitted to the conscripts and then think about a future in the professional army.
If today it is difficult to measure the effects of these ethnic and social factors on the behavior and consequences of the war in Ukraine, they should be taken into account in order to better understand the current state of Russian society. Also, the significant presence of minorities is not without correlation with the growing role of Islam in Russia, and the social makeup of the Russian military is aligned with the condition of the Russian working class, which today is affected by feelings of powerlessness and helplessness. and, no doubt tomorrow, by another impoverishment.
This article was republished from The conversation under Creative Commons license. Read theoriginal article†
